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HARRY VAN DER LINDEN 
COHEN, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 
My main objective in this paper is to show that Hermann 
Cohen's ethics offers an important but hitherto neglected contri-
bution to the- current debate within Anglo-American ethics on the 
moral status of the modern business corporation. This debate was 
started by Peter A. French, who defends the moral collectivist 
view that the corporation is a moral person and thus a subject of 
moral and legal collective responsibility ascriptions that cannot be 
reduced to, or translated into, ascriptions of responsibility to cor-
porate members. One major opposing view is what may be called 
the common moral individualist explanation and defense of the 
status quo. According to this view, corporations as collectives can 
justifiably be held 'legally' responsible but .' moral' responsibility 
ascriptions (e.g., Exxon was to blame' for the huge oil spill in 
Alaska) are to be understood as condensed expressions of saying 
that some, not further identified, corporate members are morally 
blameworthy. 
Cohen's contribution to the debate between moral collectivists 
and individualists is to be found in his transcendental analysis of 
the notion of the legal person. His analysis shows that moral and 
legal corporate responsibility ascriptions are fully justified only if 
the corporation is democratically controlled by its employees. On 
this basis, I will argue that French's collectivist view involves 
an untenable conception of corporate moral responsibility, while 
the common moral individualist explanation and defense of the 
status quo fails because, among other reasons, it neglects that 
some current legal sanctions against corporate wrongdoing may be 
unfair to employees. My final conclusion will be that Cohen's 
analysis has the critical implication that the current demand for 
increased corporate responsibility should go hand in hand with the 
demand for workers' self-management (Le., economic democracy). I 
will begin by explaining Cohen's transcendental analysis of the notion 
of the legal person. My explanation will be set forth against the 
background of a synoptic discussion of Kant's impact on Cohen's 
--:'''l~1 _ 
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view of the proper relation between individual and ideal col-
lective (totality). 
1. 11ldividttal and Totality 
Cohen states in the beginning of his major ethical study 
Ethik des reinen Willens that the concept of the human person 
(Mensch) is the subject matter of his ethics. But how is this 
concept to be understood? Cohen writes: «How about the human 
person; is he an individual? By no means is he this alone; he 
also stands as rank and file within a plurality (Mebrheit),. or 
better, within many pluralities. And he is not only this; ·in the 
totality (Allheit) he first completes the circle' ·of his being. And 
this totality also has many degrees and levels until its completion 
in a true unity, namely, in humanity, which is at the same time 
an eternal new beginning» 1. Cohen adds: «This insight must 
become the basic idea of the construction of our ethics ». 
This basic idea indicates that Cohen's view of the proper 
relation between individual and ideal collective is both indebted 
to, and critical of, Kant's view concerning this matter. Like Kant, 
Cohen defines the ideal collective, or totality, as a unified plurality 
established through general obedience to the moral law. Or,. as 
Kant himself puts it in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
the final purpose of the moral law is to make possible the realm 
of ends as the totality in which human agents t~eat one another 
as legislators, or ends in themselves, and seek to promote .one 
another's personal ends. Using the categories ·ofquantity - unity, 
plurality, and totality - from the table of categorie& in Critique 
of Pure Reasol1, Kant argues that the moral law is the unity, 
human agents and their ends constitute the. plurality, and the 
application of the unity to the plurality leads to the realm. of 
ends as a unified plurality, I.e., the totality as a harmony of ends 2. 
1 Ethik des l'eillel1 Willens (Hildesheim-New York, Georg alms 1981), 
p. 8. Reprint of the second edition of 1907. The first edition appeared in 1904 .. 
2 See Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Lewis 
White Beck (Indianapolis,Bobbs-Merrill 1959), pp. 54-55. German reference, 
Immanuel Kants Werke, edited by Ernst Cassirer (Berlin, Bruno Cassirer 
1912-22), Vol. IV, pp. 294-295. 
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Furthermore, Cohen follows Kant in holding that the individual 
who takes his own particularity, or that of the group he is part 
of, as the sole guide of his moral decision-making cannot come to 
truly moral actions: to «complete the circle of his being », to 
be autonomous, the individual must make the realm of ends, or 
a unified humanity as the highest level of the totality, the mirror 
and goal of his willing and actions. Thus both Cohen and Kant 
view autonomy as setting a task whose ultimate completion requires 
the realization of ideal humanity. Moreover, they both see this 
task as infinite: In Cohen's terms, ideal humanity is both the 
aim and « eternal new beginning» of truly moral actions. 
Opposing the totalitarian view that the collective is more 
important than the individual, Cohen emphasizes that «every com-
munity has the purpose of creating the true individual, for this 
individual can arise only from a real, healthy, and developed com-
munity; that this individual be created is, and remains, the true 
goal of all formations of communities» 3. Cohen also implicitly 
rejects here the traditional liberal view that the community, no-
. tably, the state, is a mere instrument for the realization of indi-
vidual purposes. In a sense, Cohen's criticism also applies to Kant. 
To be sure, Kant views the demo<:ratic state not as a mere means 
for enabling the pursuit of private ends ·within civil society (as 
the liberal tends to argue) but rather as an institutional precon-
dition for the emergence of the realm of ends 4 • Yet, Kant sees 
the realm of ends itself as a mere ideational or inner union of 
good wills (the «true church» as invisible church), and in this 
regard he shares the liberal's mistake of failing to recognize that 
institutional participation is an essential aspect of moral emanci-
3 See Einleitung mit kritischem Nachtrag zu Langes Geschichte des Mate-
dalismus, in COHEN, Schl'iften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, Vol. II, 
. edited by Albert GOtland and Ernst Cassirer (Berlin, Akademie 1928), p. 272. 
Reprinted from the 9th edition of LANGE'S Geschicbte des Matel'ialismus. 
4 One reason that Kant offers for this latter view is that the rule of 
law guarantees' external freedom for all, and thus reduces immorality triggered 
by the threat posed by others. See Perpetual Peace, translated by Lewis 
White Beck in KANT, On History, edited by Beck (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill 
1963), p. 123 n. German reference, Immanuel Kants Werke, Vol. VI, pp. 
462-463 n. It may also be noted that the rule of law upholds freedom of 
speech as a necessary precondition for moral decision-making. Cf. note 8, 
below. 
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pation. Cohen, to the contrary, stresses the latter point 5, ·and argues 
that all our economic, social, and political institutions must instan-
tiate the ideal of the realm of ends -'- that is, existing pluralities 
must be transformed into totalities. We can find a certain institu-
tional alienation in Kant's work in that he maintains that morality 
cannot really -become visible in the social world, whereas Cohen 
~rgues th~t the continuous moral improvement of the legal system 
is the ultImate r·ationale of the moral law (ethics) 6. 
Two additional, but related, differences between Cohen and 
Kant must be mentioned. First, Cohen stresses to a crreater degree 
the social n~tu~e. of individuals, both metaphysicall/ and morally. 
For Cohen, mdividuals are to be seen as individuals-in-relations in 
that they are defined by, but also define, social'relations, while 
~ant has < n?t yet completely k# behind, the conception of indi-
Viduals as isolated egos whose relations are external to them 7. 
Correspondingly, Cohen views the ideal moral agent as a 'coleg-
islator', as a person who arrives at moral truth in communication 
with others, whereas Kant tends to see the ideal moral agent as 
~ 'legis.lator', as. an individual who determines duty through an 
mner .dialogue wlth the moral law 8. Likewise, Cohen pays' 'more 
attentlon to the fact that collective moral praxis rather than in-
5 See, for example, Das allgemeine, gleiche und direkte' Wahlrecht in 
Schriften xur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, Vol II,' pp. 333-334. C~hen 
states here that it is a fundamental mistake to hold that moral emancipation 
~an be rea~ed :without political participation, adding that the right to vote 
IS «the preCIse Instrument for the moral education of the people ». , 
6 Cf. S. S. SCHWARZSCHILD, Introduction to Ethik des rein en Willens, p. xv. 
7 For a furthe~ d!scussion of similar conflicting «social ontologies», see 
C. C. GOULD, Rethtnktng Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
1988), Chapter 2. , 
8 It would be a mistake, however, to describe Kant's ethics as a mere 
monological ethics. This common mistake is made, for example, by ]Urgen 
Habermas. Kant recognized the importance of dialogue for any critical thought 
in What is Orientation in Thinking? In response to the claim that the 
go~ernment can take away freedom of' speech but never the freedom to 
~hmk, K.ant wrote.: «But. how much, and how correctly, would, we think 
if we dId not thmk as It were in common with others with ,,,hom we 
mutually communicate! ». See KANT, Critique of Practical Reason' and Other 
\Vr!ting~ in Mor~l Philosophy, translated by' Lewis White Beck (Chicago, 
Umverslty of Chicago Press 1949), p. 303. German reference Immanuel Kant~ Werke, Vol. IV, p. 363. For a further discussion of this is'sue, see my 
Kant/an Ethics and Socialism (Indianapolis, Hackett' 1988), pp. 35-37. 
-------~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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dividual moral action is the vehicle of fundamental moral and 
historical progress 9. Second, Cohen adheres to the Platonic method-
ological view that the explication of the ideal collective subject 
should be the basis for expounding the ideal individual subject 
and her moral law 10. Kant traverses the opposite road in Founda-
tions of the Metaphysics of Morals, explicating the moral law 
on ,the basis of our sense of duty and then deriving the ideal 
of i:he realm of ends from the moral law. 
The various similarities and differences between Cohen's and 
Kant's accounts. of the proper relation between individual and 
totality are highlighted in Cohen's transcendental analysis of the 
notion of the legal person. The main idea of this analysis is that 
the notion of the legal person can function as a model for the 
totality and that in analyzing the rational presuppositions of this 
notion' we can explicate - and justify - the totality, and with 
it the moral law and the ideal individual moral subject. 
The basic steps of Cohen's transcendental analysis of the legal 
person may be reconstructed as follows. The producer cooperative 
(<< Genossenschaft ») offers the best example of the notion of the 
legal person, and the creation of this cooperative as legal person 
presupposes that the divided wills of a mere plurality are trans-
formed into a unified will, as expressed in the charter and by-laws 
of the cooperative. In the words of Cohen: «[The] legal action 
[of becoming a cooperative] is formed through the decision [ ... ]. 
The decision is the unification of individual wills into a unified 
will. This unified will does not belong to any of the individual 
wills; it is a common will (Gesamtwille) [. .. ]. From the legal 
point of view, it is said that this common will does not represent 
the sum of the still existing wills but that it annihilates these and 
puts itself in their place. Nonetheless, this representative will is 
9 Cf. L. GOLDMANN, Immanuel Kant, translated by Robert Black (London, 
New Left Books 1971), pp. 172 and 178. Goldmann notes that the individ-
ual as such rather than the group is emphasized in Kant and that the 
effect of this ,neglect of collective praxis is that the prospect of fundamental 
social change is darkened. This point, however, should not be stressed too 
far: after all, Kant saw the French Revolution as a sign of moral and 
historical progress. For Cohen's view, see, for example, Ethik des reinen 
Willens, p. 328, where Cohen describes revolutions as «periods of experi-
mental ethics ». 
10 See Ethik des reinen Willens, pp. 7 and 14 . 
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the true real will [. .. ]. This representative unified ideal will forms 
the unity of intention and the unity of the person - the concept 
of the legal person» 11. Now since the cooperative as legal person 
displays a unified will and thus is a harmony of ends it' can 
function as a model 'for the ideal of the' totality. Furthermore, 
the cont~uation of the cooperative as (unified' person requires 
that all 1ts members have the right to vote and actively: exercise 
this right so as to arrive at cooperative policies and actions that 
are acceptable to all and accord with the charter and by-laws of 
the cooperative. Accordingly, the transcendental conditions of the 
cooperative as legal person explicate the: ideal of' 'the 'totality as a 
thoroughly democratic ideal, and this means that other instantia-
tions of the totality, such as the ideal state, i must be described 
in similar terms. Cohen writes: «The state is also a person. Only 
as a person has it unity [ ... ]. The person, of the state must be 
based on the will of the state [. .. J. The right to vote is the 
fundamental right in which the will of the state originates» 12. 
Another aspect of Cohen's transcendental analysis is that both the 
ideal moral subject and the moral law are explicated: the moral 
law as the constitutive principle of the totality demands that all 
our actions be consistent with, or mirror, the totality, and' this 
means, most importantly, that we must become colegislators of 
the institutions in which we function and that we mnst recognize 
other participants as co determiners of the policies and .actions of these 
institutions. Finally, the conclusion follows that since existing eco-
nomic, social, and political institutions are treated as legal persons, 
these institutions must become totalities, or thoroughly democratic 
institutions. 
r 
2. Collective Responsibility and Economic Democracy 
French's contention that the modern business corporation 
should be seen as a moral person and, hence, as a subject of 
collective responsibility ascriptions, poses a clear challenge to 
Cohen's transcendental analysis of the legal person. The upshot 
of Cohen's transcendental analysis is that any formally organized 
11 Ibid., p. 231. 
12 See Das allgemeine, gleiche U11d direkte Wahlrecht,' p. 332, 
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group, such as the corporation, should be conceived as moral/legal 
person, and thus as fully appropriate subject of collective responsi-
bility ascriptions, only if its will-formation is the result of a thor-
oughly democratic process. Now since the modern corporation 
lacks such a democratic process, French's contention that the cor-
poration is a moral person puts into question Cohen's attempt to 
normatively ground the demand for economic democracy on the 
basis of his analysis of the legal person. Why is it the case that 
the producer cooperative rather than the modern business cor-
poration instantiates the notion of a formally organized collective 
as moral/legal person? 
; r In order to answer this question, we must examine French's 
theory of the corporation as moral person. His theory is motivated 
by ,the view that corporate harm is typically a question not of 
individual 'moral responsibility, but of collective responsibility. 
In his detailed analysis of a well-known case of corporate harm-
Mc Doimell-Douglas' ,use of poor-functioning cargo doors on its 
DC-lO's;which led to a plane crash in Paris in 1974, killing all 
346 passengers aboard -, French points out that it is very difficult 
to: identify corporate members who can be held morally responsible 
for this crash. Some factory inspectors had been negligent, but, 
French argues, «it would be a grand offense to our moral intui-
tions, in the absence of any evidence of intentional sabotage, etc., 
to hold those inspectors primarily responsible for the crash of ship 
29 [the DC-10 that crashed] »13. Thus French concludes: «The 
aggregate· of justifiable individual responsibilities for the produc-
tion of ship 29 simply does not add up to an individual's responsi-
bility for its crash. Without a theory of the corporation as a moral 
person upon which to base [ ... ] accountability ascriptions [. .. J 
the real villain of the piece will escape moral detection. [. .. ] The 
theory of the corporation as' a moral person is intended [to 
bring] the corporate giants [ ... ] into the scope of morality» 14. 
On French's account, then, we must conceive the corporation as a 
moral person; for only in this way can moral responsibility for 
13 Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York, Columbia Univer-
sity Press 1984), p. 141. French offers an earlier defense of his theory of 
the corporation as moral persons in The Corporatioll as a Moral Person, 
«American Philosophical Quarterly», XVI (July 1979), pp. 207-215: 
14 Collective and Corporate Responsibility, p. 144. 
1 
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corporate harm be placed where it typically primarily should be 
placed - on the corporation itself. 
French holds that what needs to be shown for the corpora-
tion to be a moral person is that the corporation can bean inten-
tional actor. Obviously, the corporation can act only through the 
actions of its members, and so the task at hand is to show how their 
actions can justifiably be described as the intentional act{s) of the 
corporation. French claims that a Corporation's Internal Decision 
Structure (CID Structure) makes such a description possible. In 
his own words, the relevant aspects of the CID Structure are 
« (1) an organizational or responsibility flowchart that delineates 
stations and levels within the corporate power . structure and (2) 
corporate-decision recognition rule(s) (usually embedded in some-
thing called corporate policy)>> 15. Now the individual decisions 
made at the top of the typically hierarchical responsibility flow-
chart - such as the voting by the board of directors of a corpo-
ration -lead to a corporate act. And, French argues" this cor-
porate act can justifiably be described as an 'intentional' corpo-
rate act when it accords with the policy of the corporation. He 
states: «[W]hen the corporate act is consistent with an instantia-
tion or an implementation of established corporate policy, then it 
is proper to describe it as having been done for corporate reasons, 
as having been caused by a corporate desire coupled with a cor-
porate belief and so, in other words, as corporate intentional» 16. 
Emphasizing that the reasons ,desire, and belief of the corporation 
may but need not be identical to the reasons,' desire" and belief 
that guided the different· individual decision-makers within the 
corporation, French concludes that' corporations have «metaphys-
ical status », i.e., they are «intentional' actors in their own right 
and [. .. ] thereby full-fledged moral persons» 17. 
French's analysis is at first sight attractive' because 'it makes 
intelligible and justifiable many common moral and legal practices, 
such as blaming corporations for producing dangerous consumer 
goods, praising corporations for being community minded, and 
imposing legal fines on corporations for the violation of anti-pollu-
tion laws. In short, these practices may be seen as an extension 
15 Ibid., p. 4l. 
16 Ibid., p. 44. 
17 Ibid., p. 47. 
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of the practices of blaming, praising, and punishing biological per-
sons, governed by the same moral principles but applied to the 
corporate person. I believe, however, that French's theory of the 
corporation as moral person is untenable. 
The basic problem with this theory is to be found in its 
account of the will-formation of the corporation. French is correct 
in claiming that a decision made' in the corporate board room 
need not be in accordance with the 'initial' intentions of the 
corporate executives, but he wrongly infers that this means that 
the corporation is an. actor with its own intentions as distinct 
from the corporate executives and their intentions. Instead,' we 
should say that the corporate executives through deliberation and 
voting transform their initial intentions into a common intention, 
assuming that they recognize the CID Structure as legitimate 18. 
Here Cohen's transcendental analysis 6f the notion of the legal 
person is instructive. Cohen holds that through the democratic 
decision procedure of the cooperative, a common will is formulated, 
and that this will puts itself in the place of the initial wills of 
the cooperative. Yet, Cohen does not contend that this common 
will is separate from the wills of the members of the cooperative 
(as French would argue); rather, ,this will is ideally the will of 
each member of the cooperative after the democratic decision has 
taken place. Roughly speaking, the distinction between initial will 
and common will parallels Kant's distinction between the will of 
the inclinations, the particular will, and the will of moral reason, 
the universal will. It is through the categorical imperative as deci-
sion procedure that one's particular will is transformed into, or 
made consistent with, a moral or universal will. Likewise, it is 
through deliberation and voting within the cooperative that the 
particular or initial wills of the members of the cooperative are 
transformed into a common will. But just as it is a mistake to 
claim that moral reason is an intentional actor in its own right, 
as distinct from the individual agent, it is a mistake to argue that 
the, cooperative or corporation is an intentional actor in its own 
right as distinct from the biological individuals who make up the 
cooperative or corporation. 
18 Cf. L. MAy, The Morality of Groups (Notre Dame, University of 
Notre Dame Press 1987), pp. 69-70. 
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Fre)lch's view that the corporate will is somehow distinct from 
the wills of corporate executives is reflected in his understanding 
of corporate responsibility as a form of collective responsibility 
that is altogether separate from the responsibilities of corporate 
individuals. Thus French maintains that the total responsibility 
for the Paris air disaster is a combination of collective responsibility 
(i.e., the responsibility of tbe corporation as moral person) and the 
responsibilities of individuals, emphasizing tbe· role of collective 
responsibility. In my view (and Cohen's), collective responsibility 
is completely distributive over persons. In other words, collective 
responsibility can be analyzed in terms of the responsibility of 
individuals, in that it is a shared responsibility of individuals who 
are engaged in a cooperative enterprise, having a common inten-
tion or unified will. 
One problem with French's non-distributive conception of 
collective responsibility is that it is doubtful whether this very 
idea is intelligible. As the American ethicist Susan Wolf notes: 
«When you have put all the members of an organization to one 
side, all you have left is a set of abstract relations, a structural 
scheme, a conceptual flow chart. How can a flow chart be guilty? 
It seems that either evil lurks in the hearts of men and ·women, 
or it lurks nowhere at all» 19. Another problem with· French's 
conception of corporate responsibility is that it invites the abdica-
tion of individual responsibility: the corporate moral person be-
comes the scapegoat behind wbich the dirty hands of corporate 
executives are hidden. And a final problem with his conception is 
that it makes collective responsibility ascriptions rather pointless. 
One major function of these ascriptions in connection with such 
responses as blame and praise is to change and improve collective 
practices. But this can be effected only if individuals consider 
themselves to be responsible for these practices and, hence, view 
collective responsibility ascriptions as distributive. In French's uni-
verse, then, we may be left with perpetually ashamed corporations, 
because no one feels called upon to change their immoral behavior 20. 
19 See Tbe Legal and Moral Responsibility 0/ Organizations, «Nomos 
XXVII, Criminal Justice », New York, New York University Press 1985, 
p.273. 
20 My remark here is partly a quip on French's punishment proposal 
that corporations engaged in illegal conduct should be put to shame by the 
._--- ---- .. _._--------------------j 
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We now can turn to the heart of the matter: French's sepa-
ration of the corporate moral person and corporate responsibility 
from corporate members and their responsibilities reflects the fact 
that the corporation lacks a thoroughly democratic decision pro-
cedure. We are not justified in claiming that the corporation is 
collectively responsible - in the sense of its members having a 
shared responsibility - for corporate harm, for the actions of the 
corporation are not determined by all its members. Notably, pro-
duction workers usually do not share the responsibility for harm-
ful industrial. policies, because they generally are systematically 
excluded from shaping these policies and often are not aware of 
these policies in the first place. Even the responsibility of cor-
porate executives may be limited in that the ultimate effects of 
their decisions may be unclear to them due to the hierarchical 
CID Structure (i.e., there is an enormous gap between decision 
and execution). Also, it is understandable, though not entirely 
excusable, that lower-level managers at times ignore the harmful 
effects of decisions they make in accordance with corporate policy, 
passing the responsibility for those effects to higher-level managers. 
Last, the responsibility of stockholders as such seems, in general, 
confined by the fact that they have limited direct influence on 
shaping corporate policy. In short, it seems then that the respon-
sibility for corporate harm often cannot be ascribed completely to 
the wrong-doing of corporate members. Thus, holding on to the 
claim that the responsibility for corporate harm must somehow 
be placed on the corporation, it is not surprising that French 
arrives at the view that this responsibility must be placed on a 
person distinct from the members of the corporation, i.e., the 
corporation as moral person.' 
On the basis of these observations, several conclusions can be 
drawn. First, the undemocratic and hierarchical structure of the 
modern business corporation is a significant cause of corporate 
harm. Production workers may unwittingly bring about such harm 
due to their lack of information. Moreover, in those cases in 
forced publication of their misdeeds. See Collective and Corporate Responsi-
bility, Chapter 14. It may also be noted that although French himself warns 
against an organistic understanding of the corporation (see ibid., chapter 7), 
his punishment proposal shows that his theory of the corporation as moral 
person invites such an understanding. There is no need to repeat here the 
well-known pitfalls of organistic approaches to institutions. 
- ., ., •• ----~~~--.... '" !IIIOI!I!I!IQIIIIl4Q4!1!1l1. ;;;;;!II!iI.,.!l!!!ll2pa!!!l'i;:"......--~ 
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which production workers are aware that they are bringing about 
harm, they may not be able to prevent further harm because they 
lack the power to do so or may fear the consequences of their 
protest, if it is not already the case that their lack of control has 
fostered an attitude of moral indifference. Further, the CID 
Structure promotes an attitude of passing the responsibility for 
harm to higher levels, and those who have the decision power 
may not be aware of the ultimate effects of their decisions .. Second, 
those persons who willingly and knowingly support the CID 
Structure are partly responsible for corporate harm, irrespective 
of whether they themselves have been negligent in specific cases. 
Third, it seems that this idea of structural or institutional respon-
sibility captures the rational core of French's contention that, in 
general, the moral blame for corporate harm must be placed pri-
marily on the corporation as moral person. Fourth, Cohen and 
French ultimately develop altogether different approaches to the 
issue of collective organizational responsibility. We may interpret 
them as both starting with the question of what the conditions 
are under which responsibility can be justifiably ascribed to a 
formal group. Cohen's answer is a radical contractarian one: we 
are justified in holding an organized group morally responsible for 
its actions only if its actions are based on the consent of all the 
participants. In other words, on Cohen's account, we may con-
ceive an organization as a moral person only if the organization 
can continuously be thought of as originating in a social contract 21. 
French, to the cOhtrary, offers a metaphysical agency approach to 
collective organizational responsibility: it is only when a group 
can be described as an intentional agent distinct from its members 
that we may hold the group as such responsible for its actions. 
Fifth, French's analysis of the modern business corporation does 
21 Two recent works have developed a social contract approach to 
business organizations: T. DONALDSON'S Corporations and Morality (Engle-
wood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall 1982) and M. KEELEY'S A Social-Contract Theory 
of Organizations (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press 1988). Keeley 
offers the more detailed argument. Why Cohen arrives at a more radical 
conception of legitimate organizations on the basis of the social contract 
approach than either Donaldson or Keeley is an interesting and important 
question that falls outside the scope of this paper. That Cohen indeed offers a 
social contract approach is argued in some more detail in E. WINTER, Ethik 
find Rechtswissenschaft (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1980), pp. 282 ff. 
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not show that Cohen is mistaken in holding that the cooperative 
rather than the corporation instantiates the notion of a formal group 
as moral/legal person-at least, ona tenable interpretation of 
this notion. After all, we have seen that since the corporation 
lacks economic democracy, French is led to a wrong-headed separa-
tion of the corporation as moral person from the corporate members 
and thus to an implausible and ineffective conception of corporate 
.responsibility. Or, to put it otherwise, French hypostatizes the 
idea of a formal collective as moral person, and he is brought to 
this mistake because the corporation is not a totality· but rather 
a plurality, or a collective with a divided will. Accordingly, we 
can underscore Cohen's claim that the cooperative but not the 
corporation is a moral person in the sense of being a formal group 
with a unified collective will. Moreover, we can conclude that 
collective responsibility ascriptions in the meaning of ascriptions 
of shared responsibility are justified with regard to the corpora-
tion only if it is transformed into a democratic enterprise or 
coopera tive. 
This latter conclusion may seem to have little critical import; 
for it might be argued, as one of French's moral individualist 
critics has done 22, that the practice of blaming or praising the 
torporation is merely to be understood as a condensed wlly of 
saying that some corporate members are to be blamed or praised, 
namely, those who are morally responsible for the harmful or 
beneficial results in question. We engage then in this manner 
of· speech because we are not able, or not willing, to identify the 
blameworthy or praiseworthy corporate members. Moreover, it 
might be argued that the legal practices of imposing fines on cor-
porations and enforcing compensation for corporate harm do not 
presuppose collective moral responsibility ascriptions; rather, these 
practices are based on considerations of causal responsibility, risk 
distribution, the ability to pay, and the like 23. In short, it might 
be conceded that Cohen is right in claiming that corporations are 
not moral persons, but that this claim is not disconcerting because 
we do not treat corporations as such. 
22 M. G. VELASQUEZ, Why COI·porations Are Not Responsible for Any-
thing They Do, «Business and Professional Ethics Journal », II (Spring 
1983), p. 13. 
23 See ibid., pp. 13-14. 
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Although I believe that this brief moral individualist expla-
nation and defense of our present practices of holding corporations 
morally and legally responsible has its merits, I also believe that it 
offers a too easy legitimation of these practices. In my view, this 
common moral individualist defense of the status quo is ultimately 
unsatisfactory in itself, and also fails as a possible critique of Cohen. 
A first problem with this defense is that it overlooks what I have 
earlier called « structural or institutional responsibility». The moral 
individualist view' is correct in that moral responsibility can only 
meaningfully be ascribed to individuals, but this does not imply 
that corporate members are responsible only for the tasks defined 
by their positions. The common individualist account of moral 
responsibility for corporate harm is too narrow in that it tends 
to focus on negligent or knowingly harmful actions. What it' ig-
nores is that even if one has not directly caused a particular corpo-
rate harm one may still share the blame for this harm because 
one supports or actively participates within the kind of institution 
that is likely to cause such harm 24. Another problem with the 
moral individualist defense of the status quo is that the practice 
of blaming corporations for harmful industrial policies may induce 
shame and moral dissatisfaction among production workers, even 
though they may not be morally responsible for these harmful 
policies. After all, people often identify with the institutions in 
which they participate, whether or not they have the option to 
shape the policies of these institutions 25. A third problem is that 
since the legal practices of imposing fines on corporations' and 
seeking compensation from corporations, as well as such moral 
practices as economically boycotting companies with harmful in-
dustrial policies, are directed against corporations as a whole, they 
may quite well have the greatest negative effect on precisely those 
who are least morally responsible: the workers who have been 
fired due to the worsened financial position of their companies 26. 
24 For a further discussion of this notion of responsibility, see T. R. 
FLYNN, Sm'lre and Marxist Existentialism: The Test Case of Collective Re-
sp01lsibility (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 1984), pp. 124 ff. 
25 Cf. W. H. WALSH, Pride, Shame and Responsibility, «The Philo-
sophical Quarterly», XX (January 1970). 
26 My point here is, of course, not to argue that economic boycotts of 
corporations with immoral industrial policies are morally wrong. Rather, 
I seek to support the critical nature of Cohen's transcendental analysis by 
I 
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Both these last two problems have a common denominator: we 
cannot help but view or treat the corporation in some instances 
as if it were a moral person or unified plurality, but since the 
conditions for doing so are in fact lacking, we commit the injustice 
of harming those who are blameless. Clearly, the transformation 
of the corporation into a cooperative solves this moral dilemma. 
As a final response to the claim that Cohen's transcendental 
analysis of the legal person' has little critical import, it should be 
noted that it is only 'one' purpose of this analysis to bring to 
our attention that the cooperative solves some moral dilemmas that 
pertain to our present practices of holding corporations as such 
morally and legally accountable for their actions. We may see 
Cohen's analysis as having the more important purpose of setting 
forth conditions under which economic institutions will be more 
'responsible than they are at present." In conclusion, I wish to 
point out some reasons why the cooperative economy, thanks to 
its economic democracy, will reduce the occurrence of economic 
harm as compared to our present corporate economy. Obviously, 
these reasons are also grounds for holding that the current demand 
·for increased corporate responsibility should be linked to the demand 
for increased democracy within the workplace. 
We have noted that the undemocratic hierarchical CID Struc-
ture is a significant cause of economic harm in that it promotes 
moral indifference and an attitude of passing responsibility for 
harm to higher levels. Now since within the cooperative everyone 
has some decision power, we may anticipate a much stronger sense 
of moral responsibility Z7. It will also be less likely that within 
the cooperative one will pass responsibility for economic harm to 
others, for at least the determination of the general industrial policy 
of one's firm will be everyone's responsibility. Moreover, demo-
cracy within the workplace will make it less probable that eco-
noting that there is an inconsistency between our treatment of corporations 
as legal and moral persons and the fact that most people who make up the 
corporation lack a voice in determining its policies. I hold that economic 
boycotts are justified because the importance of changing harmful industrial 
,policies will typically outweigh the possible harm done to workers of targeted 
companies. Also, boycotts can be supplemented by various forms of support 
for, these workers. ' 
,."',, Z7 Cf. R.A. DAHL, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley, Uni-
versity of California Press 1985), pp. 98-99. 
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nomic harm will result from the fact that the decision makers 
were not aware of the impact of their decisions. After all, the 
gap between decision and execution will be much smaller in the 
cooperative. Furthermore, the interests of the decision makers 
within the cooperative,' the workers, rather than the interests of 
the decision makers within the corporation, the corporate execu-
tives, are representative of the interests of most consumers as the 
common victims of economic harm. Thus we may expect that eco-
nomic democracy will lead to a reduction of economic harm because 
workers as the decision makers will be more susceptible to the 
significance of economic harm, and because they are more likely 
than corporate executives to be themselves victims of such harm 28. 
Last, we may assume that once workers control their firms they will 
opt for performing a greater variety of tasks during their working 
day 29. Thus workers will become familiar with more aspects of the 
industrial process and increase their technological knowledge. We 
may expect that this will go hand' in hand with an increased 
awareness of the toll of modern industry on both human well-being 
and on the environment. Economic democracy makes it possible 
that this increased awareness of economic harm is translated into 
improved industrial practices. 
28 Cf. ibid., p. 100. 
29 Cohen himself argues for the overcoming of the division of labor in 
Ethik des reinen Willens, p. 607. Moreover, Cohen maintains that workers 
should become concerned with science for the sake of «truthfulness» (the 
disposition to unite moral and causal laws). See ibid., p. 506. For a more 
detailed discussion, see my Kantian Ethics and Socialism, pp. 229-231. 
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